(1918-1991) During a civil war that immediately ensued, thewestern powers (and Japan, with no loans but seeking territorialinfluence) sought to make an environment suitable for keeping their debtbeing serviced, but to no avail. The period up to 1929 saw, initially, asocialist theoretical abrogation of all foreign debt by decree and civil waruntil 1922, and then a period for restoring its wholly traumatizedagriculture until 1929. 1922 saw the beginning of secret militarycooperation with Germany which lasted until 1933. The Communist Partyleadership went through changes and great policy discussions with noreal set plans in place but with Stalin emerging in sole control by 1927. Then, in 1929, a plan was implemented called the socialization ofagriculture, which started a domino-effect. Step 1 was the removal of apercentage of the people off the farms by force and replacing them with,in theory, western mechanization/greater labor efficiency, calling theremaining farms collectivized under State management. Step 2 was tomove these freed-up farm bodies (and those from cities as well who weredeemed monarchist, religious, intellectual, parasitic, malcontents, etc.) into places where natural resources needed to be harvested and/or wherenew cities and industrial facilities needed development. (*KEY*) Themain leg-men of this policy were often the orphans who had survivedWW-1 and The Civil War and who had been traumatized into acceptingcruelty as normal. Stalin sought out this group as they were deemedreliable and they needed “security.” The cost of this labor and the rawmaterials involved is of course very low or nothing in this new commandsociety. When Ukrainian farmers resisted this, their seed grain was takenaway and several million died. (*KEY*) Between 1929-1939, Stalin undida bureaucratic system that had been in place since the 1720’s; even thatold system had its roots in the Mongolian system. (*KEY*) Everyoneworked under fear of prescribed production-or-death under his solecommand and under an ever-changing agenda. (*KEY*) This replacedthe old system of bribery, connections, and talent being important in noparticular order while working at a super-sloth-like pace. Death andreplacement didn’t sit well for these generally kind and reserved people. So, lots of people died in various places under different circumstanceswhile powerful command infrastructures evolved under Stalin’s exclusivecontrol. Earlier, Stalin had been the Commissar of Nationalities and hadcome to realize the potential of moving the masses forcibly. The loss oftheoretically expendable lives was cost effective but even today manySTILL lament and mourn the great loss of life. Russia went back tocollaborating with Germany again in 1939 via formal treaty. Hereafterimmediately began mass exiling of different nationalities to keep feedingthe labor camps. Baltic populations, Volga Germans, and Caucasiansmainly were packed off and their homelands occupied by Russians who,along with all other nationalities, were conveniently referred to as Soviets. Stalin’s strategies softened a bit with the onset of World War 2 for moralepurposes, but of course death intensified and increased at an even
greater rate. Food became a real problem. Foreign provisions (and fish from theworld’s largest fresh-water lake, Baikal in Siberia---though it almost was fished out)helped. After ww-2 Stalin went right back to his old strategies and the populationbecame even more weakened, obedient and resigned. After the war, Stalin claimedall of Eastern Europe and a portion of Germany as the beginning of a world socialistvision, as well as to compensate for Soviet lives and infrastructure lost. He keptportions of the army there and imported Russians. (*KEY*-*KEY*) This policy wasmade more effective troop/citizenry concentration-wise because the western powers,chiefly the U.S.A., denied him continued access to northern China (previouslyoccupied by the Japanese and Soviet occupied IMMEDIATELY after May 1945) andthe Persian Gulf region by threatening him with its then-exclusive A-Bomb. (*KEY*)Russians always respect force. Stalin did get to take all of Sakhalin Island and theKurile Islands from the Japanese---the latter subject (southernmost Kuriles) is still amajor stumbling block between Russia and Japan today. In Eastern Europe,Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1969) resisted against Sovietoccupation/influence, albeit meekly. The USSR’s water-polo team even physicallyassaulted/bloodied Hungary’s team during the 1956 Olympic games in Melbourne. Long after Stalin’s death in 1953, many of his management disciples still use hispersonal interpretations of socialism very effectively in Eastern Europe and CentralAsia. His greatest disciple, however, was Mao Tse Tung. Today, China, a completelyagriculturally evolved country, most interestingly and very effectively employs theexact same techniques of slave labor and nationalistic minority dilution through forcedintervention/blending. After WW-2 and continuing on through the 70’s, there was anemphasis on the lowest-cost-possible restoration and expansion of basic livingconditions, electrification (hydroelectric dams and railroads, especially)/transportinfrastructure, and the establishment of a military-industrial complex. The rawmaterials for all of these were free of charge and the same can almost be said forlabor. This equates to the entire citizenry (except for party members) living the sameway: equally low salaries and living standards. People accepted this as a necessarystep to a brighter future as promised by Soviet Socialist wisdom. Unfortunately, theycouldn’t know that money was continuing to pour out of their pockets/purses to payfor things like (domestically) the central Asian irrigation scheme and the BAM Railway(many 10’s of billions of dollars, USD, typical) and (internationally) spreading the wordof command socialism world-wide, especially in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Asias ( twice as many 10’s of billions of dollars, no one knows for sure) via free weaponsexport, etc. The period of 1963-1985 is often called a period of overall domestic stagnation as a result. As Soviet citizenry began to realize their increasing societaland economic ineffectiveness, there were more and more problematic discussionsabout donating labor without benefit. The increasingly open discussions about moreand more issues got blown out on a monster scale by the Chernobyl tragedy. Everyone realized that talk, along with the value of everything else, was cheap in theUSSR and by 1990, the entire society had lost its inertia and momentum: worn-out/outdated infrastructure, degradation of easily-accessible raw materials, adisgruntled, low-paid work force, but mainly, no REAL money or viable plan for thefuture beyond 5 years at the most. The USSR collapsed.